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Abstract
This paper shows that a shift from Ramsey optimal policy under short term
commitment (based on a negative-feedback mechanism) to a Taylor rule (based on
positive-feedback mechanism) in the new-Keynesian model is in fact a Hopf bifur-
cation, with opposite policy advice. The number of stable eigenvalues corresponds
to the number of predetermined variables including the interest rate and its lag as
policy instruments for Ramsey optimal policy. With a new-Keynesian Taylor rule,
however, these policy instruments are arbitrarily assumed to be forward-looking
variables when policy targets (ination and output gap) are forward-looking vari-
ables. For new-Keynesian Taylor rule, this Hopf bifurcation implies a lack of ro-
bustness and multiple equilibria if public debt is not set to zero for all observation.
JEL classication numbers: C61, C62, E43, E44, E47, E52, E58.
Keywords: Bifurcations, Taylor rule, Taylor principle, new-Keynesian model,
Ramsey optimal policy, Finite horizon commitment
1 Introduction
Negative feedback is the core mechanism for stabilizing dynamic systems with optimal
control (Aström and Kumar (2014)) since a negative-feedback mechanism prevents bifur-
cations of dynamic systems. Barnett and Chen (2015) and Barnett and Duzhak (2010,
2008) emphasize the importance of bifurcations in the reference new-Keynesian macro-
economic model (Gali (2015)). The Taylor rule parameters (the response of the interest
rate to ination or to the output gap) are bifurcation parameters. A small change of
their values may lead to big changes of the dynamic path, from stability to instability
and conversely.
This paper highlights additional results:
(1) Barnett and Duzhaks (2008) Hopf bifurcation, Barnett and Duzhaks (2010)
period-doubling (ip) bifurcations, and a saddle-node (fold) bifurcation for the closed
economy new-Keynesian model necessarily occur when the response of the interest rate
to ination in the Taylor rule is strictly positive and the response of the interest rate to
the output gap is strictly negative.
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(2) The seemingly surprising negative sign of the output-gap Taylor-rule parameter
is nonetheless consistent with a negative-feedback mechanism.
(3) Bifurcations necessarily occur when the response of the interest rate to ination
in the Taylor rule is strictly positive and the response of the interest rate to the output
gap is strictly positive, if ever there is a negative intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(related to limited asset market participation) and an accelerationist Phillips curve, such
that a positive output gap is correlated with an increase of future ination.
(4) For Ramsey optimal policy with nite horizon commitment (Debortoli and Nunes
(2014))1, the Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19) algorithm can be used to nd
the Taylor rule parameters: the response of the interest rate to ination in the feedback
Taylor rule is strictly above one and that the response of the interest rate to the output
gap is strictly negative.
(5) Shifting from Ramsey optimal policy to a new-Keynesian Taylor rule corresponds
to a Hopf bifurcation, because the policy instrument (the interest rate) and its lag are pre-
determined variables in Ramsey optimal policy, whereas they are assumed to be forward-
looking for the ad hoc new-Keynesian Taylor rule. Ramsey optimal policy has two ad-
ditional stable eigenvalues with respect to the new-Keynesian Taylor rule equilibrium.
Ramsey optimal policy is based on a negative-feedback mechanism. The new-Keynesian
Taylor rule is based on a positive-feedback mechanism.
The welfare loss of time-inconsistency, used as an argument against implausible innite-
horizon commitment, is in fact negligible for Ramsey optimal policy with short-horizon
commitment. It is plausible to assume at least a few periods (two quarters or two weeks)
before policy makers re-optimization (Schaumburg and Tamballoti (2006), Debortoli
and Nunes (2014)), because the deviation of the optimal path following re-optimization
is small. A negative-feedback mechanism is also saved for a non-zero, such as an inn-
itesimal or very small probability (say 1%) of not reneging commitment at each period
(Schaumburg and Tamballoti (2006), Debortoli and Nunes (2014)).
By contrast, the bifurcation leading to the decrease of the number of stable eigenvalues
based on positive-feedback mechanism when shifting to a new-Keynesian Taylor rule
implies at least two drawbacks:
(1) In case of imperfect knowledge of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, the
positive-feedback mechanism of the new-Keynesian Taylor rule is only robust to a much
smaller set of misspecications by the evil-agent than robust Ramsey optimal policy
(Giordani and Söderlind (2003), Zhou, Doyle and Glover (1995), Hansen and Sargent
(2008, 2011)). This lack of robustness is why control theory is based on the principle of
negative-feedback mechanism instead of positive-feedback mechanism.
(2) There is uniqueness of Ramsey optimal policy, but we get multiple equilibria of the
new-Keynesian Taylor rule, unless all dynamic equations of controllable predetermined
state variables of the private sector (wealth, debt, capital stock) are arbitrarily replaced
by non-controllable auto-regressive equations of exogenous forcing-variables at the nal
step of computations. Leeper (1993) is a classic example of multiple equilibria with
one controllable forward-looking variable and one controllable backward-looking variable,
including the "scal theory of the price level" as one equilibrium. Each of these equilibria
will not be robust to a wide set of misspecication.
Section two shows that Barnett and Duzhaks (2008, 2010) bifurcations occur for a
negative output-gap rule-parameter. Section three shows that Ramsey optimal policy
1These models are related to models with quasi-commitment (Roberds (1987), Schaumburg and Tam-
balotti (2007), Kara (2007), Fujiwara, Kam and Sunakawa (2016)).
2
has a representation of its policy rule with a negative output-gap rule-parameter. Section
four shows that Barnett and Duzhaks (2008) Hopf bifurcation corresponds to a shift
from Ramsey optimal policy to a new-Keynesian Taylor rule. Section ve states that
this bifurcation implies major changes with respect to robustness and multiple equilibria.
Section ve concludes.
2 Bifurcations in the New-Keynesian Model
The new-Keynesian private sectors four-equations model is written with all variables as
log-deviations of an equilibrium (Gali (2015)). In the representative households intertem-
poral substitution (IS) consumption Euler equation, current output gap xt is positively
correlated with expected output gap and negatively correlated xt with real rate of interest,
equal to the nominal rate it minus expected ination Ett+1. The intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (IES)  = 1= is a measure of the responsiveness of the growth rate of con-
sumption to the interest rate, usually considered to be smaller than one. It is the inverse
or the relative degree of resistance to intertemporal substitution of consumption (RISC)
of  (the relative uctuation aversion), which measure the strength of the preference for
smoothing consumption over time, usually considered to be larger than one.
xt = Etxt+1    (it   Ett+1) + zx;t where  > 0 (1)
A non-controllable exogenous stationary and predetermined variable zx;t is auto-
regressive of order one (0 < jz;xj < 1) where "g;t are zero-mean, normally, independently
and identically distributed additive disturbances. Initial values of predetermined forcing
variable are given.
zx;t = z;xzx;t 1 + "x;t where "x;t is i.i.d. N
 
0; s2x

, zx;0 given, (2)
In the new-Keynesian Phillips curve,  discounted expected ination is equal to cur-
rent ination plus a negative linear function of current output gap with a sensitivity  .
Sign restrictions are such that parameters ; ;  are all strictly positive.
t = Ett+1 + xt + u;t where  > 0 and  > 0
A non-controllable exogenous stationary and predetermined variable "cost-push shock"
u;t is auto-regressive of order one ( 0 < juj < 1) where "u;t are zero-mean, normally,
independently and identically distributed additive disturbances. Initial values of prede-
termined forcing variable u;0 is given.
u;t = uu;t 1 + "u;t where "u;t is i.i.d. N
 
0; s2

, u;0 given. (3)
For initial values of the two forcing variables set to zero, the new-Keynesian model with
its feedback Taylor rule can be written as follows. The matrices notations in bold below
corresponds to the general notations of the augmented linear quadratic regulator (LQR)
in Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sargent (1996, p.203). Firstly, the controllable
variables dynamics are:
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The two policy targets are two-time-step controllable by a single policy instrument
(the e¤ect of the interest rate on the expected output gap on the rst period is followed
on the next period by an e¤ect of the output gap on expected ination):
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Kalman (1960) controllability (here, one policy instrument can control two policy
targets in two periods) is the generalization to linear dynamic systems of Tinbergen
(1952) principle for a static linear system of equations (n policy instruments can control
n policy targets in a single period).
The closed loop matrix Ayy+ByFy of the controllable part of the new-Keynesian
model is:
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Wonhams (1967) pole placement theorem for a controllable dynamic linear system
and for a single instrument (single input) implies that for any set of symmetric complex
(or real) eigenvalues (1; 2) of the closed loop matrix of the new-Keynesian model, there
exist a unique set of linear feedback policy rule parameters (Fx; F). Wonhams (1967)
pole placement theorem states that linear feedback rule parameters are always bifurcation
parameters of controllable linear systems. Close to bifurcations limit values, a small
change of the policy rule parameters leads to big qualitative change of the dynamics of
the system to be controlled, through a change of stability of eigenvalues.
The characteristic polynomial of the closed loop matrixA+BF of the new-Keynesian
model is function of the trace T and determinant D:
0 = P (X) = X2   T:X +D;
Its eigenvalues (the roots of the characteristic polynomial) are non-linear functions of
trace and determinant:
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T +
p
T 2   4D
2
and 2 =
T  pT 2   4D
2
Trace T and determinant D of closed-loop matrix A+BF are a¢ ne function of the
Taylor rule parameters Fx and F, where constants are respectively trace T (A) and
determinant D (A) of open-loop matrix A:
T (A+BF) = 1 +
1

+


+ Fx = T (A) + Fx (4)
D (A+BF) =
1

+
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Conversely, the Taylor rule parameters Fx and F are a¢ ne function of the trace T
and determinant D:
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1
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In Azariadis (1993, chapter 8), a stability triangle with Hopf, ip and saddle-node
bifurcations borders and a quadratic function delimiting complex conjugate versus non-
complex solutions (discriminant   0) are described in the plane of the trace and
determinant (T;D). This denes areas with with zero, one or two stable eigenvalues
(1; 2) in the plane (T;D).
Using the a¢ ne relationship between (T;D) and Taylor rule parameters (F; Fx)
and based on table 1 computations, gure 1 draws a stability triangle bordered by Hopf,
period-doubling (ip) and saddle-node bifurcations in the plane of Taylor rule parameters
(F; Fx), which are then two bifurcation parameters. This denes areas with with zero,
one or two stable eigenvalues (1; 2) in the plane (F; Fx), with a unique relation between
Taylor rule parameters (F; Fx) and (1; 2) as a particular single instrument case of
Wonham (1967) pole placement theorem for controllable system.
Table 1 summarizes apexes of the stability triangle. It also includes its center with
both eigenvalues equal to zero (1 = 2 = 0). This provides the Taylor rule parameters
with the fastest stabilization. It includes the laissez-faire case, where both Taylor rule
parameters are zero. The laissez-faire ("open loop") private sectors model is described
by the Fed following a xed interest rate target or peg: it   i = 0. In this case, the
transition matrix of the new-Keynesian model has one stable eigenvalue less than one in
absolute value and the other eigenvalue is unstable (larger than one).
Table 1: Apexes and center of the stability triangle and laissez-faire of the
new-Keynesian model ( = 0:5 and  = 0:1).
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Point A is the Hopf and Saddle-node bifurcations intersection. Point B is the Hopf and
Flip bifurcation intersection. Point C is the Saddle-node and Flip bifurcation intersection.
Figures 1 to 3 represents bifurcations lines delimiting the number of stable eigenvalues
for the new-Keynesian model for positive sign restrictions on monetary policy transmis-
sion mechanism (gures 1 and 3) and for negative sign restrictions on monetary policy
transmission mechanism (gure 2).
Figure 1:  = 0:5,  = 0:1,  = 0:99: stability triangle in the plane (F; Fx)
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Figure 2:  =  0:5,  =  0:1,  = 0:99: stability triangle in the plane (F; Fx)
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Figure 3: to be inserted here, see last page.
(1) The Hopf bifurcation inequality condition is D < 1 computed by Barnett and
Duzhak (2008) with a limit pair of complex conjugate solution of absolute value equal to
one.
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D < 1) Fx <    1

  F
If F > 0) Fx <    1

< 0:
The Hopf bifurcation corresponds to the segment between point A and point B. With
conjugate complex roots on both sides of the segment, the economy shifts from damped
oscillations dynamics to exploding oscillations. It is an upper limit of the triangle in
gure 1 and an lower limit of the triangle in gure 2.
(2) The saddle-node bifurcation inequality condition is P (1) > 0 with one limit
eigenvalue equal to 1. It corresponds to equation 4.4 in Barnett and He (2015) although
they do not explicitly mention it may correspond to a saddle-node bifurcation:
P (1) = 1  T +D > 0) Fx > 
1   (1  F) or F > 1 

1  


Fx (8)
if Fx < 0) F > 1 (9)
The saddle-node bifurcation corresponds to the near-vertical segment between point
A and point C. It is the Taylor principle condition: the ination Taylor rule ination
parameter should be above one: F > 1  
 
1 


Fx > 1. This bifurcation boundary
corresponds the case where one root of the characteristic polynomial of the transition
matrix of the new-Keynesian model is equal to one: P (1) = 0. It corresponds to a shift
from two real stable eigenvalues (inside the triangle) to one unstable and one stable on
the left-hand side of the triangle. The near-vertical line F = 1 
 
1 


Fx above the point
A of the triangle corresponds to a shift from one unstable and one stable eigenvalue one
the left-hand side to two unstable eigenvalue on the right hand side. The near-vertical
line F = 1 
 
1 


Fx below the point C of the triangle corresponds to a shift from one
unstable and one stable eigenvalue one the left-hand side to two unstable eigenvalue on
the right hand side.
(3) The period-doubling (ip) bifurcation inequality P ( 1) > 0 with one limit
eigenvalue equal to  1 is computed by Barnett and Duzhak (2010).
P ( 1) = 1 + T +D > 0) Fx >  2

  
1 + 
  
1 + 
F (10)
The period-doubling (Flip) bifurcation corresponds to the segment between point C
to point B, with is the lower side of the triangle in gure 1 and the upper side of the
triangle in gure 2. The economy shifts from convergent and sign change every period
dynamics (inside the triangle) to divergent and sign change every period dynamics (below
the triangle in gure 1 and above the triangle in gure 2).
(4) A quadratic function delimits complex conjugate solutions. It crosses the case
when both eigenvalues are zero.
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(5) The case of fastest stabilization with two identical eigenvalues equal to zero cor-
responds to point D with Taylor rule parameters F = 5:7 and F =  3:6 at the inter-
section of a vertical and dot lines and the parabola  = 0 delimiting complex conjugate
(damped oscillations dynamics) versus real solutions (damped dynamics) on gure 1. It
corresponds to F = 5:7 and F = 3:6 in gure 2 for opposite signs of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism.
(6) When the Taylor rule parameters are both equal to zero (interest rate peg or
laissez-faire) with correspond to the origin of the plane F = Fx = 0 in gures 1 and 2,
the economy is outside the stability triangle. The Taylor principle where the Taylor rule
ination parameter should be larger than one is not fullled. There is one stable and one
unstable eigenvalue.
Proposition 1. For strictly positive intertemporal elasticity of substitution  > 0
and a strictly positive slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve  > 0 and  positive,
close and below to one (for example   0:99), a necessary condition for having two
stable eigenvalues ( j1j < 1 and j2j < 1) in the closed-loop transition matrix of the
new-Keynesian model is that if rule parameters (Fx; F) are inside in a triangle such that
the output gap parameter is strictly negative (Fx < 0) and the ination rule parameters is
larger than one
 
F > 1 
 
1 


Fx > 1

, according to the Taylor principle. The stability
triangle with two stable eigenvalues lies into the second quadrant of the plane (F; Fx).
Proof. Eigenvalues are both stable (j1j < 1 and j2j < 1) implies:
Fx >  2

  
1 + 
  
1 + 
F for P ( 1) > 0 (11)
As 0 <   0:99 < 1, (e.g.   0:99), the line (D = 1) is over the line (P ( 1) = 0)
for F > 1 and Fx < 0:
   1

>  2

  
1 + 
and    >   
1 + 
(12)
With opposite sign restrictions  < 0 and  < 0, triangles of gure 1 are found by
symmetry with respect to the horizontal axis in the positive quadrant of (Fx > 0,F >
1   1 


Fx).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2. For a strictly positive intertemporal elasticity of substitution  >
0 and a strictly positive slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve,  > 0, a negative
Taylor rule parameter on the output gap is a necessary condition for a negative-feedback
mechanism.
The new-Keynesian transition matrix is:
Etxt+1
Ett+1

=

1 + 

+ Fx    + F
 

1


xt
t

Etxt+1 converges faster to equilibrium with respect to laissez-faire (negative-feedback
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0 >  
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 > 0
As Taylor rule parameters have only a correlation on ination after two periods, we
iterate for ination:
Et (t+2) =

1 + 
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Fx

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The negative response of the interest rate to the output gap is decreasing the absolute
value of eigenvalues with respect to laissez-faire (negative feedback mechanism) is caused
by the intertemporal substitution e¤ects in the Euler consumption equation and in the
new-Keynesian Phillips curve. A rise of current interest rate leads to an increase of fu-
ture consumption next period (and a decrease of current consumption). An increase of
consumption leads to a decrease of future ination (and a decrease of current ination).
Negative-feedback targets to decrease the auto-correlation of future values of policy tar-
gets, in order to fasten convergence back to the set-point long run equilibrium.
it "() Et (xt+1) "() Et (t+2) #
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3. For strictly negative intertemporal elasticity of substitution  > 0
and a strictly negative slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve  > 0 and  positive,
close and below to one (for example   0:99), a necessary condition for having two
stable eigenvalues ( j1j < 1 and j2j < 1) in the closed-loop transition matrix of the
new-Keynesian model is that if rule parameters (Fx; F) are inside in a triangle such that
the output gap parameter is strictly positive (Fx > 0) and the ination rule parameters is
at least slightly below one
 
F > 1 
 
1 


Fx

, according to the Taylor principle.
Proof. Same computations than for proposition 2 with opposite signs for  and .
Q.E.D.
Alternative monetary policy transmission mechanisms
In gure 2, an increase of the interest rate leads to a decrease of future production
( < 0) (due to limited asset market participation (Bilbiie (2008), Bilbiie and Straub
(2013)) which leads to a decrease of ination next period, through the accelerationist
Phillips curve ( < 0) as in Romer (2012, chapter 11). Havranek (2015) and Havranek et
al. (2015) found near zero estimates at macro level or negative estimates of  for some
country in their meta-analysis. Ball (1994) started a theoretical debate on the sign of .
Mavroeidis et al. (2014) found hundreds of negative estimates of  using U.S. data.
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it "() Et (xt+1) #() Et (t+2) #
Taylor (1999) assume no intertemporal substitution e¤ect ( = 0), with a user cost
of capital channel e¤ect only on current output (Chatelain and Ralf (2016)). Gali (2015)
assumes the production function does not depend on capital. Hence, Gali (2015) assumes
that the user cost of capital channel does not exist. Taylor (1999) also assumes an
accelerationist Phillips curve e¤ect, with a positive correlation between output gap and
future ination, instead of the negative correlation:
it "() xt #() Et (t+1) #
Assuming ination is forward-looking with the new-Keynesian Phillips curve with a
marginal cost of working capital including the interest rate into the marginal cost (Chris-
tiano et al. (2010), Bratsiotis and Robinson (2016))), the monetary policy transmission
channel is a based on the correlation between expected ination and the cost of capital:
it "() Et (t+1) #
Changing the sign of the transmission mechanism may change the sign of negative-
feedback rule parameters.
3 Ramsey optimal policy with nite horizon commit-
ment
The policy maker optimizes again on its previously given Ramsey optimal policy plans
at least three periods after the previous optimization (a commitment of not optimizing
again until the duration T  3), as in Debortoli and Nunes (2014, appendix 4). A short
nite horizon commitment is close to a dynamic version of static "rational inattention"
(Sims (2010)), assuming discrete re-optimization over time, instead of continuous-time
optimization. For example, the European Central Bank has meetings every two Thurs-
days: the duration of commitment T could be viewed as a duration of at least six weeks.
One may also re-scale each discrete time period as three shorter sub-periods.
The policy maker could also re-optimize on each future period with exogenous prob-
ability ("stochastic replanning" (Roberds, 1987), "quasi commitment" (Schaumburg and
Tambalotti, 2007; Kara 2007) or "loose commitment" (Debortoli and Nunes, 2014)). This
assumption is observationally equivalent to Chari and Kehoe (1990) optimal policy under
sustainable plans facing a punishment threat at a given horizon in case of deviation of
an optimal plan (Fujiwara, Kam, Sunakawa (2016)).
The policy maker minimizes the expectation of the present value W of a discounted
quadratic loss function Lt over a nite horizon of duration T  3. He chooses respect
to the policy targets (ination and the output gap) with a positive weight on the second
policy target (output gap) x  0 and a weight normalized to  = 1 for ination (the
limit case  = 0 can also be taken into account) and with a strictly positive adjustment
cost parameter i > 0 on the volatility of her policy instrument (the interest rate) and a
discount factor :
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
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+ i
i2t
2

; T  3 (13)
subject to the private sectors new-Keynesian four equations model (equations (1)
to (4)), with initial conditions for predetermined state variables and natural boundary
conditions for private sectors forward variables. Denoting Lagrangian multipliers x;t
for the consumption Euler equation and ;t for the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, the
Lagrangian L is:
L =  E0
TX
t=0
t


2t
2
+ x
x2t
2
+ i
i2t
2
+ x;t [xt   xt+1 +  (it   t+1)] + ;t [t   tt+1   xt]

(14)
The law of iterated expectations has been used to eliminate the condition expectations
that appeared in each constraint. Because of the certainty equivalence principle for
determining optimal policy in the linear quadratic regulator including additive normal
random shocks (Simon (1956)), the expectations of random variables ut are set to zero
and do not appear in the Lagrangian.
Because ination and the output gap are assumed to be forward-looking, they are
optimally chosen at the initial date t = 0 and at the nal date t = T according to
transversality conditions, also called natural boundary conditions (Debortoli and Nunes
(2014), appendix 4):
;t=0 = x;t=0 = ;t=T = x;t=T = 0 (Transversality conditions) (15)
The Hamiltonian system with Lagrange multipliers of the linear quadratic regulator
includes two stable roots and two unstable roots:
xt = xt+1 +  (it   t+1) (16)
t = tt+1 + xt (17)
@L
@t
= 0) t + ;t   ;t 1   

x;t 1 = 0 for 0  t  T; (18)
@L
@xt
= 0) xxt   ;t + x;t   1

x;t 1 = 0 for 0  t  T; (19)
A bounded optimal plan is a set of bounded processes ft; xt;it; x;t; ;tg for date
0  t  T of the Hamiltonian system that satisfy the monetary transmission mechanism
four equations, the rst order equations and the optimal initial conditions.
The link between the Lagrange multipliers and the interest rate is given by:
@L
@it
= 0) iit + x;t = 0) x;t =  i

it for 0  t  T;
The boundary conditions and the marginal conditions leads to these constraints on
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the interest rate:
@L
@it
= 0) iit + x;t = 0) x;t =  i

it for 0  t  T; (20)
;t=0 = x;t=0 = ;t=T = x;t=T = 0 hence (21)
i 1 = i 2 = 0 = iT 1 = iT 2 (i0 6= 0 for the shortest horizon T = 3) (22)
Using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chap-
ter 19.3.1, step 1, p.769) solve a Riccati equation which allow to compute endogenous
optimal negative-feedback rule parameters (Fx;R; F;R). Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan
and Sargent (1996, p.203) rst consider that auto-regressive shocks are initially set to
zero (z0 = 0) to solve this Riccati equation. They do not depend on auto-regressive para-
meters of exogenous variables. Then, Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sargent (1996,
p.203) take into account the exogenous auto-regressive process of forcing variables. They
solve the rule parameter responding to shocks Fz;R; Fu;R. This step one representation of
the optimal Ramsey policy rule depends on all four variables of the private sector:
it = Fxxt + Ft + Fzzt + Fuut (23)
Besides the two stable eigenvalues of the block of endogenous variables, there are the
two stable eigenvalues which are the auto-regressive parameters of the block of the two
predetermined and exogenous forcing variables (productivity and cost-push shock).
Ljunqgvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19, step 2) computes the linear stable subspace
constraint between Lagrange multiplier (in this paper: x;t; ;t) and the variables of the
private sector t = Pyyt + Pzzt. The matrix Py is the unique solution of a discrete
time Riccati equation (Sargent and Ljungqvist (2012), chapter 19) and Pz is the unique
solution of a Sylvester equation in the augmented discounted linear quadratic regulator
(Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sargent (1996), p.202-204).
Ljunqgvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19, step 3) substitute the forward-looking
variables (in this paper: xt; t) in the rule by their Lagrange multiplier (in this paper:
x;t; ;t) using the linear constraint t = Pyyt+Pzzt. This representation of the Ramsey
optimal policy rule is a function of four predetermined variables (t; zt) which are not
observable.
Ljunqgvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19, step 4) solve for the optimal initial anchor
of forward-looking variables on predetermined variables:
t = Pyyt +Pzzt, 0 = 0, Py invertible () y0 =  P 1y Pzz0. (24)
Ljunqgvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19.3.7) mention another representation of Ram-
sey optimal policy rule which depends lags of the policy instruments and of predetermined
variables.
Giannoni and Woodford (2003) is a di¤erent representation of Ramsey optimal policy
rule which depends on lags of policy instruments and of forward-looking variables (ina-
tion and the output gap), see also Chatelain and Ralfs (2017) algorithm. All variables are
observable. They substituted the predetermined auto-regressive forcing variables (zt; ut)
by lag one and two of the interest rate (it 1; it 2). Other observationally equivalent rep-
resentations of Ramsey optimal policy rule can use leads or lags of other variables than
the policy instrument.
All the various representations of the rule of Ramsey optimal policy corresponds to
12
linear substitutions change of variables which are taken as vector basis. They are all
observationally equivalent taking into account the other equations of the stable solution
of the Hamiltonian system. The eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian system are invariant to
these changes of vector basis related to a change of representation of the rule of Ramsey
optimal policy.
Step 1 representation of the rule of Ramsey optimal policy is such that the rule
parameters with respect to ination and the output gap are represented in gure 1 (for
z0 = 0), with bifurcations and areas for stable and unstable eigenvalues. For each of the
innite number of other observationally equivalent representations of the rule of Ramsey
optimal policy, including leads or lags and/or linear change of variables (vector basis)
within the stable subspace of Ramsey optimal policy, another specic gure could be
done to highlight bifurcations.
Proposition 4. The Taylor rule parameters on ination and on the output gap in
Ljunqgvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19) step 1 representation are located in a subset
of the stability triangle of section 2.
Proof. Ramsey optimal policy assumes that ination and the output gap are forward-
looking and that the policy instrument (the interest rate) and its lag are predetermined.
Two stable eigenvalues in the block of two endogenous variables of the new-Keynesian
model are required to satisfy Blanchard and Kahns (1980) determinacy condition. The
reduced form Taylor rule parameter have to lie in the areas where both eigenvalues are
stable, that is, in the stability triangle.
Q.E.D.
The key principle is that negative-feedback mechanism is stabilizing forward-looking
variables, such as output and ination, during a nite short horizon (the duration of a
monetary policy regime), leaning against ination and output gap spirals.
For a numerical example, let us consider that the monetary policy regime last at
least ten years (T = 80 quarters), which may correspond to Benati and Goodhart (2010)
duration of recent monetary policy regimes for the Fed since the 1960s. It can be roughly
approximated by the innite horizon LQR solution of the matrix Riccati equation which
can only be solved numerically with a system of two policy targets. Shorter horizon T
solutions can be computed using Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2006) algorithm. Table
2 and gure 3 provides the boundaries of the LQR reduced form Taylor rule parameters
triangle, obtained by a simulation grid varying the weights in the loss function in three
dimensions. The apexes of the LQR triangles corresponds to the cases where the central
bank minimizes only ination, or only the output gap or only the interest rate.
Table 2: Step 1: Linear quadratic regulator rule parameters triangle,  = 0:1;  =
0:5;  = 0:99; z = u = 0:9.
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Minimize only:  x i 1; j1j 2; j2j F Fx Fz Fu
Ination 1 0 10 7 7:10 5 0:006 21:21  3:92  2:01 39:5
Ination output gap 4 1 10 7 4:10 7 0:819 4:76  2:27  2:01 17:6
Ination output gap 1 1 10 7 4:10 7 0:905 3:03  2:10  2:01 12:8
Ination output gap 1=4 1 10 7 4:10 7 0:951 2:10  2:01  2:01 8:90
Output gap 0 1 10 7 4:10 7 0:995 1:21  1:92  2:01 2:95
Output gap interest 0 4 1 0:348 0:953 1:70  1:31  2:21 6:78
Output gap interest 0 1 1 0:541 0:918 1:83  0:98  2:43 7:38
Output gap interest 0 1=4 1 0:663 0:878 1:87  0:82  2:42 7:55
Interest rate 0 0 1(+1) 0:748 0:832 1:89  0:74  2:46 7:60
Ination interest 1=4 0 1 0:784 0:784 1:99  0:77  2:43 7:85
Ination interest 1 0 1 0:772 0:772 2:22  0:83  2:37 8:45
Ination interest 4 0 1 0:742 0:742 2:82  0:98  2:26 9:95
Table 3: Step 4: optimal initial anchor,  = 0:1;  = 0:5;  = 0:99; z;x = z; = 0:9.
Minimize only:  x i z0 u0 z0 u0
Ination 1 0 10 7 x0 10 4  10:1 0 10 5 10 6
Ination output gap 4 1 10 7 x0 10 6  1:25 0 10 8 3:14
Ination output gap 1 1 10 7 x0 10 6  0:49 0 10 8 4:91
Ination output gap 1=4 1 10 7 x0 10 6  0:16 0 10 6 6:66
Output gap 0 1 10 7 x0 10 6 10 6 0  10 6 9:61
Output gap interest 0 4 1 x0 0:35 1:53 0  0:56 7:18
Output gap interest 0 1 1 x0 0:58 2:52 0  0:79 6:20
Output gap interest 0 1=4 1 x0 0:72 3:13 0  0:92 5:63
Interest rate 0 0 1(+1) x0 0:73 3:14 0  0:92 5:63
Ination interest 1=4 0 1 x0 5:00  10:3 0 0:71  0:04
Ination interest 1 0 1 x0 4:45  10:3 0 0:61  0:03
Ination interest 4 0 1 x0 3:45  10:2 0 0:42  0:02
In gure 3, the LQR triangle is within the stability triangle. In table 3, vertexes of the
LQR triangle corresponds to the central bank minimizing only the variance of ination
(ination nutter) without notice of the zero lower bound constraint on the policy interest
rate (i = 10 7 > 0), or minimizing only the variance of output gap without notice of
the zero lower bound (i = 10 7 > 0) or seeking only maximal inertia of the policy rate
(i ! +1).
- When the central bank is an ination nutters, both eigenvalues are close to zero
(it corresponds to point D). To stabilize ination in the second step of the transmission
mechanism, one needs rst to stabilize the output gap on the rst step. This is the reason
why both eigenvalues are equal to zero. The optimal anchor leads to an initial jump of
ination to zero, whereas the output gap jump is not zero.
- The lower side of the LQR triangle correponds to no lower bound constraint (no
cost of changing the policy rate) and to changes of the relative weight on the output gap
variance with respect to ination variance. The lower the weight  for a given weight
x, the lower F the response of interest rate to ination in the Taylor rule, the larger
the initial jump of ination, the lower the initial jump of the output gap.
- When the central bank is an output gap nutter, one eigenvalue is zero (related
to output gap stabilization in next period based on the Euler consumption equation).
However, the other eigenvalue tends to one when the weight of ination is zero. There
is no margin of errors on the ination Taylor rule parameters with respect to the saddle-
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node bifurcation This second eigenvalue is related to the new-Keynesian Phillips curve
and ination auto-regressive parameter, which only occurs on the second period of the
monetary policy transmission mechanism.
- A second side of the LQR triangle is the closest of the saddle-node Taylor principle.
It corresponds zero ination weight  = 0 and a rising relative cost of changing the
policy instruments with respect to output gap weight. The lower the weight x for a
given weight on the policy instrument i, the higher F the response of interest rate to
ination in the Taylor rule, the lower the initial jump of ination, the larger the initial
jump of the output gap. "Mostly ination eigenvalue" decreases from 0:995 to 0:83.
"Mostly output gap eigenvalue" increases from zero to 0:75.
- When the central bank uses minimum energy control (it minimizes only the volatil-
ity of its policy instrument (or "input"): x =  = 0, i > 0), the eigenvalue 0:75
corresponds to the stable eigenvalue of laissez-faire matrix
p
Ayy and the second stable
eigenvalue 0:83 = 1=1:20 is the inverse of the unstable eigenvalue 1:20 of the laissez-faire
matrix
p
Ayy.
- The second upper side of the LQR triangle corresponds to zero weight on the output
gap, and a relative increase of the weight of ination with respect to the weight of the
policy instrument. The higher the weight  for a given weight on the policy instrument
i, the ination Taylor rule parameter rises from 1:89 to 21:2 (ination nutter case). The
ination initial jump decreases towards zero.
4 Hopf bifurcation from Ramsey optimal policy to
New-Keynesian Taylor rule
4.1 Hopf bifurcation
The very rst paper (Currie and Levine (1985)) inventing the equilibrium of simple rule
with forward-looking variables considered an ad hoc general linear stochastic rational
expectations model which includes n  m predetermined policy targets and m forward-
looking policy targets.
For Ramsey optimal policy, n Euler equations on Lagrange multipliers (missing in
the ad hoc simple rule system) belongs to the Hamiltonian system besides n equations of
the transmission mechanism. The Hamiltonian system of the linear quadratic regulator
includes n stable eigenvalues (related to n   m predetermined state variables and m
predetermined costate variables of forward-looking state variables). They mention that
for Ramsey optimal policy "we have n stable and n unstable roots" (Currie and Levine
(1985) p.238). The determinacy condition is "just the set of necessary conditions for
maximization of a quadratic function subject to linear constraints" (Blanchard and Kahn
(1980), p.1309).
For simple rule with forward-looking variables, Currie and Levine (1985) are "con-
cerned only" with solutions that the number of eigenvalues of the closed loop transition
matrix which are stable equals n m (eigenvalues having negative real parts in continuous
time or modulus strictly below one in discrete time), which is smaller than n stable roots
for Ramsey optimal policy. They "conne attention" to representations of linear time
invariant feedback rule on the n m predetermined variables (Currie and Levine (1985)
p.234-235). In this case, policy instruments and their lags only respond to predetermined
variables: they are necessarily forward-looking variables.
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The underlying assumption consistent with control theory is that the policy maker
only considers as policy targets the subset of predetermined variables and exclude forward-
looking variables from policy targets. Such an underlying assumption contradicts the nar-
rative of the new-Keynesian model, because the policy targets (ination and output gap)
are assumed to forward-looking variables. All the predetermined variables are exogenous
(hence, non-controllable) auto-regressive forcing variables. They are never described as
policy targets in new-Keynesian theory. The trick to conceal this contradiction is to use
the property that the two forward-looking policy targets (ination and the output gap) are
linear functions of the two predetermined forcing variables of the new-Keynesian model.
New-Keynesian theory conne attention to representation of the linear time invariant
feedback rule responding on the m = 2 forward-looking variables instead of the represen-
tation of the linear time invariant feedback rule responding to n m = 2 predetermined
variables, by contrast to Currie and Levine (1985).
When all the predetermined variables are non-controllable and when their number
n  m is assumed to be equal to the number m of forward-looking variables, the linear
substitution of predetermined variables by forward-looking variables in the representation
of the policy rule demonstrates that for ad hoc simple rule, forward-looking policy targets
are seemingly related to forward-looking policy instruments. This is the opposite of the
Ramsey optimal policy with nite or innite horizon: forward-looking policy targets are
related to predetermined policy instrument (and some of their lags, if the number of
policy instruments is smaller than the number of policy targets).
Proposition 5. Shifting from optimal policy under nite horizon commitment to
new-Keynesian Taylor rule with positive Taylor rule parameters corresponds to a Hopf
bifurcation in the new-Keynesian model.
Proof. The area for positive Taylor rule parameters correspond to two unstable
eigenvalues of the new-Keynesian controllable and endogenous block transition matrix,
whereas the area for Ramsey optimal policy lies within the stability triangle, with two
stable eigenvalues. The bifurcation border to cross corresponds when shifting from Ram-
sey optimal policy to positive new-Keynesian Taylor rule parameter to Hopf bifurcation,
where at the Hopf bifurcation border, the two eigenvalues are complex conjugate.
Q.E.D.
This bifurcation has consequences for robust control and multiple equilibria.
4.2 Bifurcation and robust control
For robust optimal control, the central bank is uncertain about the model. The policy
maker thus design a robust rule minimizing the maximum of losses as if he was facing an
evil agent.
For robust simple rule, Giordani and Söderlind (2004, p.2386-8) "propose to be more
specic about the set of model the evil agent can choose (that is, the type of misspecication
feared), by imposing that he sets his instruments as a linear function of predetermined
variables... Else, by strategically exploiting expectations, an agent free to commit can
drive the loss function to innity for any degree of robustness... The misspecication
feared is then a trend increase (or decrease) of ination." Giordani and Söderlind (2004)
propose to restrict evil agent misspecications. He turns to be an "angel agent" forbid-
den to select bifurcations of expectations outside the stable subspace of a given simple
rule. Without this restriction, if ever the Central Bank makes the slightest mistake on
evaluating forward-looking expectations, the new-Keynesian Taylor rule leads to trend
16
increase or decrease of ination and/or output gap. Expectations are supposed to be
perfectly known by contrast to backward-looking variables, whereas practitioners may
perceive the opposite.
For robust Ramsey optimal policy, the evil agent can set his instruments as a linear
function of predetermined variables and forward-looking variables. Hence, robust Ramsey
optimal policy (Hansen and Sargent (2008, 2011)) is robust to a much broader set of evil-
agent misspecications than new-Keynesian Taylor rule, because its stable subspace is of
dimension n (due to negative-feedback mechanism) instead of dimension n m (due to
positive-feedback mechanism).
4.3 Bifurcation and multiple equilibria
Kalman (1960) demonstrated the uniqueness of the Riccati solution and the optimal pol-
icy rule in the case of the linear quadratic regulator with boundary conditions leading to
n stable eigenvalues of the closed loop matrix Ayy+ByFy for n controllable policy targets
for 2n equation of the Hamiltonian systems. This corresponds to Ramsey optimal policy.
The determinacy condition is "just the set of necessary conditions for maximization of a
quadratic function subject to linear constraints" (Blanchard and Kahn (1980), p.1309).
When varying the policy rule Fy (instead of assuming it is given), if one seeks a num-
ber of stable eigenvalues 0 < n  m < n lower than the number n of controllable policy
targets and strictly above zero, the Riccati equation may have multiple solutions (Freiling
(2003), Chatelain and Ralf (2014c)). There are as many equilibria as the number of com-
binations picking n m stable eigenvalues in a total set of n controllable eigenvalue (that
could be stabilized by the policy rule according to Wonhams theorem, with relationships
i (Fy)). There is only one combination to pick n stable eigenvalues in a set of n eigen-
values (Kalmans (1960) LQR solution). There is only one combination to pick 0 stable
eigenvalues in a set of n controllable eigenvalues (Gali (2015) new-Keynesian model). For
a DSGE macro-prudential model including two agents (households and nancially con-
strained banks) with two controllable forward-looking ows of saving variables and two
controllable predetermined stocks of debt, there are already six combinations (equilibria)
to pick 2 stable eigenvalues in a set of 4 controllable eigenvalues.
A famous example of multiple solutions of matrix Riccati equation is Leepers (1993)
scal theory of the price level (FTPL) equilibrium. The FTPL is an equilibrium such as
"ination eigenvalue" is stable and "public debt eigenvalue" is unstable, by contrast to
another equilibrium where "ination eigenvalue" is unstable and "public debt eigenvalue"
is stable. These multiple equilibria "à la Leeper" happen if the private sector variables
includes at least one controllable predetermined state variable (the stock of wealth, the
stock of private and/or public debt, the stock of capital) and at least one controllable
forward-looking costate variable such as consumption. If all the policy instruments of ad
hoc policy rules are arbitrarily assumed to be forward-looking, there should be at least
one stable eigenvalue and one unstable eigenvalue. When varying the policy rule Fy,
any values of the eigenvalues of the controllable system can be reached. Two types of
equilibria can be reached: one with j1 (Fy)j > 1 and j2 (Fy)j < 1 and the second one
with j1 (Fy)j < 1 and j2 (Fy)j > 1.
On gure 1, if ever we assumed arbitrarily that ination is predetermined and output
gap is forward-looking (or the reverse), the rst type of equilibria à la Leeper with only
one stable eigenvalue is reached by policy rule parameters in upper-left area of the plane of
rule parameters. The second type of equilibria à la Leeper with only one stable eigenvalue
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is reached by policy rule parameters in lower-right area of the plane of rule parameters.
Gali (2015) rules out multiple equilibria à la Leeper in footnote (3): "The assump-
tions of a representative household and a zero net supply of one-period debt, guarantee
that [transversality condition] (6) is always satised in equilibrium, since Bt = 0 for all
observation allows us to ignore that condition in much of what follows."
Once eliminating all the endogenous controllable predetermined state variable, there
remains only forward-looking controllable ination and output. A degenerate rational ex-
pectations equilibrium without predetermined variables is such that determinacy imposes
that all forward-looking always instantly jump on their long-run equilibrium values.
In order to avoid (1) a degenerate rational expectations equilibrium and (2) multiple
equilibria "à la Leeper", Gali (2015) replaces households controllable state variable by
at least one non-controllable auto-regressive forcing variable.
From the point of view of control, if the private sector state variable (the stock of
wealth, which is fully invested in one-period public debt) is always zero for all observation,
it is not controllable and it is always stable at its equilibrium value. Then, households
Euler consumption rst order equation of the private sector is an irrelevant condition.
5 Conclusion
Barnett and Duzhaks (2008) Hopf bifurcation corresponds to a shift from Ramsey op-
timal policy to a new-Keynesian Taylor rule for a given new-Keynesian monetary policy
transmission mechanism including the new-Keynesian Phillips curve and the intertempo-
ral substitution Euler equation of consumption.
To base stabilization on a positive-feedback rule-mechanism contradicts the key princi-
ple of a negative-feedback mechanism of control (Aström and Kumar (2014)). A positive-
feedback rule for stabilization would require more robust theoretical foundations, the
practical evidence of its use, and the empirical evidence of its success for stabilizing the
economy.
Distinguishing positive-feedback mechanism from negative-feedback mechanism re-
quires a simultaneous estimation of the policy transmission mechanism and of the policy
rule. Testing the Taylor rule principle or the sign of the response of the interest rate to
the output gap in an estimation of a single equation of the Taylor rule cannot inform
about new-Keynesian positive-feedback versus negative-feedback macroeconomic stabi-
lization if the signs and the magnitude of the e¤ects involved in the policy transmission
mechanism are not simultaneously estimated.
Further research may test Ramsey optimal policy versus a new-Keynesian Taylor
rule for the joint model of Euler consumption equation and the new-Keynesian Phillips
curve, following Chatelain and Ralf (2017b) tests and estimations in the case where the
transmission mechanism is only the new-Keynesian Phillips curve (Gali (2015), chapter
5). A key insight is that positive-feedback stabilization policy requires more structural
parameters to t the data than negative-feedback stabilization policy (Chatelain and Ralf
(2017b and 2017c). This may lead to parameter identication issue (Chatelain and Ralf
(2014c)). If positive-feedback stabilization policy is not well grounded and destabilizes
the economy, it is a concern that it should be applied to model macro-prudential policy
(Chatelain and Ralf (2014a)).
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6 Appendix 1: Scilab code
Download the open source software Scilab and copy and paste the following code in the
command window, for given preferences of the central bank (Qpi, Qx, R) and given mon-
etary policy transmission mechanism parameters (beta1, gamma1, kappa, rho1, rho2).
Transition matrix are multiplied by
p
 in order to take into account discounting as
proposed by Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sargent (1996). Formulas for Riccati,
Sylvester and rule parameters are taken in Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sargent
(1996).
Qpi=4;Qx=0;R=1;Qxpi=0;
beta1=0.99; gamma1=0.5; kappa=0.1;
rho1=0.9; rho2=0.9; rho12=0;
Qxrho1=0; Qpirho1=0;
Qxrho2=0; Qpirho2 =0;
A1=[1-(kappa*gamma1/beta1) -gamma1/beta1 ; -kappa/beta1 1/beta1] ;
A=sqrt(beta1)*A1;
B1=[gamma1 ; 0];
B=sqrt(beta1)*B1;
Q=[Qx Qxpi ;Qxpi Qpi ];
Big=sysdiag(Q,R);
[w,wp]=fullrf(Big);
C1=wp(:,1:2);
D12=wp(:,3:$);
M=syslin(d,A,B,C1,D12);
[Fy,Py]=lqr(M);
A+B*Fy;
Py
Fy
spec(A+B*Fy)
abs(spec(A+B*Fy))
A+B*Fy
A
B
Ayz=[-1 gamma1/beta1 ; 0 -1/beta1 ];
Azz=[rho1 rho12; rho12 rho2 ];
Qyz=[Qxrho1 Qpirho1 ; Qxrho2 Qpirho2 ];
BS=-Azz;
AS=(A+B*Fy);
CS=Qyz+AS*Py*Ayz;
Pz=sylv(AS, BS, CS, d);
AS*Pz*BS+Pz-CS;
norm (AS*Pz*BS+Pz-CS);
N=-inv(Py)*Pz;
Fz=inv(R+B*Py*B)*B*(Py*Ayz + Pz*Azz);
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sp1=spec(A+B*Fy)
sp1t=sp1
Py
Pz
Spectrum=[sp1t rho1 rho2 ]
abs(spec(A+B*Fy))
F=[Fy Fz ]
N
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Figure 3: Ramsey optimal policy LQR dark triangle within the stability triangle (determinacy with two stable 
eigenvalues). New-Keynesian Taylor rule area in light grey (determinacy with zero stable eigenvalues). 
Inflation Taylor rule parameter on the horizontal axis, output gap Taylor rule parameter on the vertical axis. 
 
 
 
Figure 3bis: Stability triangle in the trace and determinant plane (Azariadis (1993), figure 8.4). (not for 
publication). 
 
